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 Financial and Labor Market Determinants of Mortgage Delinquency Rates: 
McLean County, IL, 1985-2011 
 
Jake Mann, Illinois Wesleyan University 
 
1 Introduction 
It is generally understood that the 2007-2009 recession in the United States had its roots 
in the real estate market. To quote Schiller (2008): “a speculative bubble in the housing market 
(...) has now caused ruptures among many other countries in the form of financial failures and a 
global credit crunch” (p. 1). There is a growing body of literature on the economic impact of the 
bursting of this “speculative bubble”. Efforts have been directed at examining how financial 
institutions have been impacted and at considering different efforts to re-regulate this industry. 
As the economic recovery from this particular recession has been slower than after previous 
contractions, particularly in terms of job creation, research efforts have also focused on labor 
markets. In this paper we propose to examine the interplay between financial and labor market 
factors and the real estate market at the local level. We study McLean County, Illinois, as this 
county, while being the largest in the state in terms of square mileage, has a median income level 
and a home ownership rate comparable to those of Cook County –where the City of Chicago is 
located. 
As Marcano and Ruprah (2011) report, recent economic literature tends to cast the 
phenomenon of mortgage default, the precursor to potential property foreclosure, as either an 
issue of strategic behavior or as an issue of inability to pay. Regarding the issue of strategic 
behavior and mortgage defaults, significant attention has been devoted to the study of why and 
when homeowners choose to stop making their monthly mortgage payments. The premise that 
homeowners will “walk away” from their properties when the value of the mortgage is greater 
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than the home price, a situation known as having “negative equity” or “being “underwater”, fits a 
crude cost-benefit analysis of such a situation. Yet, Foote et al. (2008) find that “contrary to 
popular belief, […] negative equity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for foreclosure” 
(p. 1). In fact, they report that fewer than 10 percent of homeowners experiencing negative 
equity on their homes eventually experience foreclosure.  
Moreover, Mian and Sufi (2008) place the onus of foreclosures on the lenders, as “the 
expansion in the supply of credit driven by disintermediation is responsible for the rapid increase 
in new loan originations, house price appreciation, and subsequent large increase in default 
rates” (p. 4). Similar conclusions regarding lending standards and mortgage securitization are 
reached by Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Haughwout et al. (2008), and Keys et al. (2008). The 
prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgage instruments during the build-up of the housing bubble 
also played a central factor in the buildup of negative equity. As Bucks et al. (2008) point out, 
borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages were much more likely to misunderstand the terms of 
their mortgage contract than their peers. Particularly, they were “likely to underestimate or to not 
know how much their interest rates could change” (p. 1). 
Regarding the issue of inability to pay and mortgage defaults, research efforts have been 
focused on identifying the factors that prevent the homeowners from making their monthly 
payments. Such factors can be broadly categorized as either financial (e.g. interest rates on the 
mortgaged principal) or labor-market related (e.g. the employment status of the homeowner). 
Previous real estate market crises informed the work of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) and 
Deboer and Conrad (1988), who found that unemployment rates are positively related to 
mortgage and property tax delinquency levels respectively. More recently, Mayer et al. (2009) 
find that “In areas with widespread increases in unemployment, house prices generally decline; 
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demand for housing falls as income drops and workers migrate to other areas in search of jobs” 
(p. 42). Financial factors have also been considered. Gerardi et al. (2007) estimation results 
indicate that the short-term London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and unemployment rate are 
positively associated with foreclosure levels. Also, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) find that 
at the outset of the 2006-2007 housing crisis the delinquency rate on fixed-rate mortgages 
actually fell and that the ‘variable’ delinquency rate rose enough to cause a cumulative increase 
in the aggregate delinquency rate. 
We focus our study on the arguments related to the inability to pay, rather than on the 
moral hazard argument, in order to address an ongoing public policy argument: whether 
mortgage defaults are more strongly influenced by the weakness in the labor market or by the 
actual costs of financing the mortgages. The policy implications of this argument are enormous. 
If the costs of mortgages is found to be more relevant than, let’s say, the unemployment rate in 
explaining mortgage defaults, policy efforts should be focused on facilitating debt re-financing; 
if the inverse is true, policy efforts should prioritize job-creation to stem the mortgage defaults 
and foreclosures. Cordell et al. (2008) offer their own answer to this question when reporting 
that the “deadweight losses” derived from foreclosures could be reduced with “loss mitigation” 
(i.e. re-financing). 
We expect that an increase in either fixed or variable interest rates decreases 
homeowners’ ability to make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency 
rates. Changes in fixed and variable mortgage interest rates should impact homeowners in 
slightly different ways. A change in the fixed interest rate will only affect newly granted fixed-
rate mortgages for either the acquisition of a new house or for the refinancing of the current one. 
Homeowners already locked-in with a fixed rate and not looking into re-financing would not be 
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affected. A change in the variable interest rate, however, affects the current cost of financing a 
house purchase financed through a variable interest instrument. We also expect that a 
deterioration of the general condition of the local labor market decreases homeowners’ ability to 
make their mortgage payments, thus increasing delinquency rates. An increase in the local 
unemployment rate would signal a decrease in the current average income from labor. 
We focus our study on the McLean County housing market because it could be 
representative of statewide trends. With a population of nearly 170,000 residents, mostly 
concentrated in the adjacent City of Bloomington and Town of Normal, nearly 275,000 mortgage 
deeds have been granted over the past 26 years. During most of our period of analysis, 1985-
2011, the mortgage delinquency rate has wandered around a mean value of 2.00 percent; yet 
starting in 2005 it began to grow, peaking at a value above 9.00 percent in 2010. The 
metropolitan unemployment rate has also been increasing and the regional mortgage financing 
costs have been at, or above, national averages. As mentioned above, the County has a housing 
market fairly representative of the rest of the state. To begin with, it contains well defined and 
distinct urban and a rural “submarkets”. Also, the county’s average population per household 
(2.46) and homeownership rate (67.70 percent) are within a five percent margin of the national 
average values. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology, examining the stationarity of the series; Section 3 identifies the best-fitting linear 
regressions used to examine the behavior of mortgage delinquency rates, discussing our findings; 
lastly, Section 4 presents conclusions and outlines policy implications. 
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2 Data and Methodology 
In McLean County, mortgage delinquencies are registered through the issuances of a lis 
pendens, which are notices informing the grantee of a mortgage that the grantor's payments are 
90 days past due. These notices are filed with the County’s Recorder’s Office and are accessible 
through an online database. By dividing the number of lis pendens filings by the total number of 
mortgage deeds issued, the monthly delinquency rate is computed. Our sample period starts in 
January 1985 and ends in December 2011: a total of 310 observations. Our sample period 
contains a total of 274,310 mortgage deeds and 5,887 lis pendens, resulting in an average 
delinquency rate of 2.15 percent. As seen in Figure 1, the series displays a period of relative 
stability between 1985 and 2004, when the monthly delinquency rate oscillates between 1.50 and 
2.00 percent. The evolution of the twelve-month moving average of the mortgage delinquency 
rate suggests a change in the long-term trend by the end of 2005. 
National interest rates are obtained from the FRED database maintained by the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank. These rates represent an average of the borrowing costs in the United 
States. Regional interest rates are obtained from the primary Mortgage Market Survey conducted 
by the federal agency Freddie Mac. These rates represent borrowing costs within the North 
Central region, comprising the states of Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Iowa, North Dakota and South Dakota. We compile both the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage 
Average and the 1-Year Adjustable Rate Average. Figure 2 compares national and regional fixed 
interest rates.  Figure 3 compares national and regional variable rates. In both cases, secular 
declining trends are easily observable. Although the fixed rate is generally higher than the 
variable rate, this difference has ebbed and flowed dramatically in the last decade. In fact, during 
the most recent recession both rates were effectively identical.  
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In our sample period regional fixed interest rates have been an average of 0.06 percentage 
points above the national value. Similarly, regional variable interest rates have exceeded national 
values by an average of 0.15 percent. In December 2011, the end of our sample, the national 
fixed rate rested at 3.96 percent while the national variable rate was 2.79 percent. In this same 
month, the regional fixed rate was 3.97 percent while the regional variable rate was 3.06 percent. 
Labor market indicators for McLean County are obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Metropolitan Area Survey. The compiled series, the unemployment rate and the 
number of unemployed workers, display similar cyclical behavior. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show 
that both labor market indicators declined between 1990 and 2000, with the unemployment rate 
reaching a low of 2.2 percent in 1998. Increasing, afterward, the unemployment rate peaked at 
5.2 percent in 2005 before declining once again –this time to 3.9 percent in 2007. The latest 
nation-wide economic contraction has brought the county-level unemployment rate to its highest 
in 20 years: 9.1 percent. 
In order to determine what structural relationship may link financial and labor market 
variables with the mortgage delinquency rate, we will estimate several linear regression models 
through Ordinary Least Squares. First, we will study the impact of labor and financial variables 
on mortgage delinquency rate separately and then we will combine them into a single regression 
equation. The first step in our model-building effort is to determine the order of integration of 
each series: if a series is integrated of order zero, I(0), it follows that it is stationary in levels.   
We compute the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic to determine the presence 
of a unit root in the series. Following econometric convention, we first compute the natural 
logarithmic value of the series in order to induce linearity.  Table 1 reports the results of the ADF 
tests of the variables in log-levels (top section) and in first-order differences of the log-levels 
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(bottom section). Except in the case of the mortgage delinquency rate we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that any of the series in log-levels has a unit root within a 95 percent confidence 
interval. We will put forward the argument that the pseudo-stationary behavior of the mortgage 
delinquency rate between 1985 and 2005 influences the value of the ADF test statistic for the 
whole sample period. When the first-order differences of the log-level values are considered the 
reported ADF test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in 
any of the series. Thus, we conclude that all the series are integrated of order one, I(1), and that 
they should be incorporated into our subsequent regression efforts in terms of growth rates.  
In order to check the robustness of our findings we also compute the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shim (KPSS) test statistic to directly ascertain the potential stationarity of the 
series. Table 2 reports the results of the KPSS tests of the variables in log-levels (top section) and 
in first-order differences of the log-levels (bottom section). In the case of the mortgage 
delinquency rate and the labor market indicators we strongly reject the null hypothesis that, in 
log-levels, these series are stationary; in the case of the financial market indicators we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of stationarity within a 95 percent confidence interval. When the first-
order differences of the log-level values are considered the reported KPSS test statistics allow us 
not to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for all the series. As above, we conclude that all 
the series are integrated of order one, I(1), and that they should be incorporated into our 
subsequent regression efforts in terms of growth rates. 
 
3 Estimation Results 
We now turn to estimating a structural model of county-level mortgage delinquency rates 
as a function of labor and financial market factors. We study each of these sets of factors 
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separately and then combine them in order to present the best-fitting linear regression model. We 
employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology to estimate the parameters of these 
families of models. Our first set of estimating equations relates the mortgage delinquency rate 
with labor market factors. Besides the growth rate in the number of unemployed workers and the 
growth rate in the unemployment rate we considered the growth rate in the number of employed 
workers as a potential explanatory variable. Because none of our estimation formulations 
including this last variable yielded any significant result we chose not to include this equation in 
our discussion of results.   
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Model A and Model B. In both models we 
incorporate a lagged (t-1) value of the dependent variable as an independent variable in order to 
capture the concept of persistence in the behavior of mortgage delinquency rates. The regression 
parameter associated with this variable is highly significant and almost identical across model 
specifications. Its negative sign indicates that an increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency 
rate during any given month is followed the next month by a decrease (increase) in the mortgage 
delinquency rate. For example, when the mortgage delinquency rate increases by 10 percent 
during the previous month we should expect a 3.63 (on average) percentage decrease in its value 
this month. Thus, the mortgage delinquency rate does not increase continually.  
We also include a dummy variable in order to capture an abnormally large drop in the 
value of the mortgage delinquency rate during the early months of 1992: during the first quarter 
of the year the number of recorded lis pendens notices was less than three a month. We attribute 
these low values to either a clerical issue related to the recording the notices or to a possible 
change in the legal process regarding the issuing of a lis pendens notice itself. The parameter 
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associated with this dummy variable is highly significant and, as should be expected, negative in 
sign. 
Model A examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency rate 
and the metropolitan area unemployment rate. Due to the delay between the time a homeowner 
becomes unemployed and the time a mortgage is considered to be in default – recall that in the 
State of Illinois a mortgage is in default after 90 days of non-payments – we lag this variable by 
four (4) periods. The regression parameter associated with this variable is highly significant and 
positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate four 
months ago translates into a 0.70 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate 
during the current month.  
Lastly, Model B examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage 
delinquency rate and the metropolitan area number of unemployed individuals. For the same 
reasons discussed above, we lag this variable by four (4) periods. The regression parameter 
associated with this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent 
increase (decrease) in the number of unemployed individuals four months ago translates into a 
0.76 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month. We 
hypothesize that a change in the number of unemployed workers has a larger impact on the 
mortgage delinquency rate than a change in the unemployment rate due to the structure of the 
local labor market.  
Due to the limited range of horizontal mobility in terms of potential employers in the 
county we expect that when a worker becomes unemployed she or he leaves the area in order to 
become occupied in a similar activity. Thus, when the actual number of unemployed workers 
residing in the area increases its impact on mortgage delinquency rates is larger than that of an 
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identical increase in the area unemployment rate. The explanatory power of our linear regression 
efforts focused on labor market factors yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on average) 23 
percent of the variance in the rate of growth of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics 
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in 
the residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated or 
that they are normally distributed. 
Our second set of estimating equations relates the mortgage delinquency rate with 
national and regional financial market factors.  Table 4 presents the estimation results of Model 
C and Model D. As before, in both models we incorporate a lagged (t-1) value of the dependent 
variable as an independent variable in order to capture the concept of persistence in the behavior 
of mortgage delinquency rates. Our findings are almost identical to those presented above and 
we will refer the reader to that section of the paper in order to economize space. The dummy 
variable discussed above is also incorporated in these models. 
Model C examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage delinquency rate 
and national-level fixed and variable interest rates. Due to the delay between the time fixed 
interest rates change and the time a homeowner notices changes in her or his potential mortgage 
financing costs we lag this variable by two (2) periods. The regression parameter associated with 
this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase 
(decrease) in the national-level fixed interest rate on mortgages two months ago translates into a 
2.71 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month.   
Somehow surprisingly, we cannot establish any significant statistical relationship 
between the national-level variable interest rate on mortgages and the county-level mortgage 
delinquency rate. We put forward the hypothesis that the local real estate market, while moving 
 11
along with national trends of ballooning activity between 2003 and 2007, did not share the 
“bubble” qualities associated with large volumes of adjustable-rate mortgages prevalent in other 
areas. Therefore, only a small fraction of local homeowners was exposed to the variable 
financing costs brought about by these financial instruments.  
Lastly, Model D examines the relationship between the county-level mortgage 
delinquency rate and regional-level fixed and variable interest rates. For the same reasons 
discussed above, we lag this variable by two (2) periods. The regression parameter associated 
with this variable is highly significant and positive in sign. We find that a one percent increase 
(decrease) in the regional-level fixed interest rate on mortgages two months ago translates into a 
2.27 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during the current month. 
Again, we cannot establish any significant statistical relationship between the variable interest 
rate on mortgages and the mortgage delinquency rate, even though in this case we consider 
regional-level variable interest rates. We will refer the reader to the argument we put forward 
above. The explanatory power of our linear regression efforts focused on financial market factors 
yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on average) 21 percent of the variance in the rate of 
growth of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude 
definitely that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that they are normally 
distributed. 
Our final estimation effort combines labor and financial market factors. Besides the one-
period lagged value of the growth rate in the mortgage delinquency rate and the event dummy 
discussed above we include the growth rates in the regional fixed interest rate on mortgages and 
in the area-level number of unemployed. As before, we lag these variables in order to capture the 
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delay in the reaction of the mortgage delinquency rate that follows a change in both labor market 
and mortgage financing conditions. The regression parameters associated with these variables are 
highly significant and positive in sign. We note that when considered simultaneously the 
magnitude of the parameter linking the number of unemployed with the mortgage delinquency 
rate increases (by 2.33 percent) while the magnitude of the parameter linking the fixed interest 
rate on mortgages with the mortgage delinquency rate decreases (by 17.66 percent).  
Nevertheless, the impact of changes in financial factors is 2.38 times larger than the 
impact of changes in labor market factors. In fact, a 10 percent increase (decrease) in the fixed 
interest rate on mortgages translates into an 18.69 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage 
delinquency rate, while a 10 percent increase (decrease) in the number of unemployed 
individuals translates into a 7.85 percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency rate. 
This regression yields the highest R-square of all of our models: we are able to explain 24 
percent of the variance in the rate of growth of the delinquency rate. Finally, the residual 
diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the regression residuals are 
not autocorrelated or that they are normally distributed. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Our study of the behavior of the mortgage delinquency rate in McLean County, IL 
attempts to explain it as a function of several different factors. We consider, independently and 
jointly, labor market indicators such as the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate 
and financial market indicators such as the 30-year fixed and 1-year variable mortgage interest 
rates. Both national-level and regional-level mortgage interest rates are, alternatively, examined 
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as potential explanatory variables. We find that the OLS regression yielding the best overall fit is 
capable of explaining 24 percent of the variance in the growth rate of the mortgage delinquency 
rate over time. More importantly, we find that when the number of unemployed individuals or 
the fixed mortgage interest rate change, even by the same percentage amount, the reaction of the 
mortgage delinquency rate is remarkably different in terms of order of magnitude. In our sample 
period the impact of changes in financial factors on the county-level mortgage delinquency rate 
is 2.38 times larger than the impact of changes in labor market factors. 
This empirical finding is potentially useful to address an ongoing local debate on whether 
it is the job losses associated with the latest recession or the onerous financing terms of 
properties suddenly devaluated by the collapse of the real estate market that is resulting in larger 
numbers of mortgage defaults and, eventually, foreclosures. Our conclusion that financial market 
indicators play a larger role than labor market indicators could help focus the policy responses to 
the ongoing problem of property foreclosures. We will argue that policy efforts in this area 
should emphasize loss-mitigation (i.e. refinancing) instead of job-creation.  
In that light, we are happy to report that a lender-borrower mediation process has been 
recently implemented as part of the legal foreclosure proceedings in the local court system. On 
the other hand, our research leads us to believe that recent reductions in the unemployment rate, 
both at the national and local levels, would not have as much of a dampening effect on the 
number of county-level mortgage defaults as many would expect. Finally, we will point out the 
fact that although local and regional policy-makers may be able to influence, to a degree, labor 
market conditions in the area their degree of influence over financial market conditions is 
severely constrained. In other words, regulation and control of financial market conditions is 
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mostly conducted at the national level, where local and regional interests and priorities are 
multiple and often conflicting. 
In terms of potential avenues of future research we propose to study the time series 
characteristics of the fillings of lis pendens notices by themselves. A visual examination of this 
series seems to indicate a semi-continuous process: a month with a relatively high number of lis 
pendens notices filed is frequently followed by a month with a relatively low number of lis 
pendens notices filed. The resulting seesaw plot of the series may provide a clue regarding the 
prevalent rejection of the null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the regression residuals. A 
potential manipulation of these series through some sort of moving average or filtering process 
could merit future research efforts. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Delinquency Rate and 12-Month Moving Average 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Regional and National 30-Year Fixed Mortgage Interest Rates 
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Figure 3: Regional and National 1-Year Variable Mortgage Interest Rates 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate in McLean County 
 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
National Variable Interest Rate
Regional Variable Interest Rate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Unemployment Rate - McLean County
 18
 
 
Figure 5: Total Number of Unemployment Individuals in McLean County 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests 
Sample period: June 1990: December 2011 
Constant+trend Significance 
Variables in logarithms 
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity  
Delinquency rate -3.8881 ** 
Unemployment rate -2.3174 
Unemployed -2.2151 
Fixed interest rate, regional -3.2723 * 
Fixed interest rate, national -3.2888 * 
Variable interest rate, regional -1.5903 
Variable interest rate, national -1.7320 
Critical values (%) 
1 -3.9875 
5 -3.4242 
10 -3.1351   
Variables in logarithms and first order 
differences 
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity  
Delinquency rate -11.18235 *** 
Unemployment rate -3.6219 ** 
Unemployed -3.8281 ** 
Fixed interest rate, regional -12.8864 *** 
Fixed interest rate, national -12.8054 *** 
Variable interest rate, regional -14.8323 *** 
Variable interest rate, national -10.3244 *** 
Critical values (%) 
 1 -3.9875 
5 -3.4242 
10 -3.1351   
 
Table 1: Results of the ADF Test for Unit Roots 
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Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity tests 
Sample period: June 1990: December 20 
  Constant+trend Significance 
Variables in logarithms 
The null hypothesis is stationarity 
Delinquency rate 0.3899 
Unemployment rate 0.3755 
Unemployed 0.3714 
Fixed interest rate, regional 0.0765 *** 
Fixed interest rate, national 0.0706 *** 
Variable interest rate, regional 0.0859 *** 
Variable interest rate, national 0.0836 *** 
Critical values (%) 
1 0.2160 
5 0.1460 
10 0.1190   
Variables in logarithms and first order differences 
The null hypothesis is stationarity 
Delinquency rate 0.1223 ** 
Unemployment rate 0.0926 *** 
Unemployed 0.1076 *** 
Fixed interest rate, regional 0.0514 *** 
Fixed interest rate, national 0.0485 *** 
Variable interest rate, regional 0.0924 *** 
Variable interest rate, national 0.0845 *** 
Critical values (%) 
1 0.2160 
5 0.1460 
10 0.1190   
 
Table 2: Results of the KPSS Test for Stationarity 
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in the Delinquency Rate (t=0) 
n = 259 
  
Model A Model B 
  
Constant 0.0139 0.0132 
(0.4606) (0.4375) 
% ∆ in Delinquency Rate -0.3637*** -0.3628*** 
 (t - 1) (-6.6027) (-6.5951) 
% ∆ in Unemployed Population  0.7675*** 
 (t - 4) (2.7845) 
  
% ∆ in Unemployment Rate  0.7022*** 
 (t - 4) (2.6791) 
  
Dummy variable  -2.6546*** -2.6737*** 
 (January 1992) (-5.4579) (-5.5040) 
  
R-squared 0.2292 0.2309 
P (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values 
White's test (heteroskedasticity) 0.0960 0.0741 
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000 0.0000 
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0158 0.0145 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results: Model A and Model B. 
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in the Delinquency Rate (t = 0) 
n = 305 
  
Model C Model D 
  
Constant 0.0258 0.0223 
  (0.8340) (0.7287) 
  
% ∆ in Delinquency Rate -0.3888*** -0.3853*** 
 (t - 1) (-7.5430) (-7.5220) 
  
% ∆ in National Fixed Interest Rate  2.7128*** 
 (t - 2) (2.6631) 
  
% ∆ in National Variable Interest Rate  1.0225 
 (t - 3) (0.8562) 
  
% ∆ in Regional Fixed Interest Rate  2.2710*** 
 (t - 2) (2.1401) 
  
% ∆ in Regional Variable Interest Rate  1.1483 
 (t -1) (1.0855) 
  
Dummy variable  -2.6319*** -2.620*** 
 (January 1992) (-4.9260) (-4.9016) 
  
R-squared 0.2176 0.2161 
P (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values 
White's test (heteroskedasticity) 0.1784 0.1893 
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000 0.0000 
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results: Model C and Model D. 
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Dependent variable: % ∆ in Delinquency Rate (t = 0) 
n = 259 
  
Model E 
  
Constant 0.1963 
  (0.6506) 
  
% ∆ in Delinquency Rate  -0.3709*** 
 (t - 1) (-6.7568) 
  
% ∆ in Regional Fixed Interest rate  1.8698** 
 (t - 3) (1.9049) 
  
% ∆ in Number of Unemployed  0.7854*** 
 (t - 4) (2.8624) 
  
Dummy variable  -2.6450*** 
 (January 1992) (-5.4704) 
  
R-squared 0.2417 
P (F-stat) 0.000 
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values 
White's test (heteroskedasticity) 0.0703 
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000 
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0075 
 
Table 5: Estimation Results: Model E. 
